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Aseries of political protests in recent years, including localist ralliesfor the June 4 Massacre, anti-parallel trading protests, and the MongKok Riot, have triggered concerns over the development of “localism”
(bentu zhuyi 本土主義) in Hong Kong. For decades, traditional pan-demo-
cratic parties (fan minzhupai泛民主派) have been struggling with the Chi-
nese government over political development. Although many of them have
persistently bargained with the Beijing leaders, progress towards democracy
remains stagnant. Thus, Hong Kong’s democrats have been beset by “tran-
sition fatigue,” which commonly exists in hybrid regimes that combine both
democratic and authoritarian elements. (1) A growing number of Hong Kong
people, especially youngsters, have become impatient, disappointed, and
sceptical towards the existing pan-democratic parties, and have shifted into
the localist camp in order to search for new direction against political in-
tervention by China. 
Localism, according to Law Wing-sang, refers to a political movement that
focuses on the preservation of Hong Kong’s identity and autonomy. (2) The
movement includes a multitude of groups with different goals, ranging from
advocating greater autonomy to independence for Hong Kong, but most of
them have developed a strong sense of local identity and object to growing
political encroachment by the Beijing government into Hong Kong’s polit-
ical, economic, and social affairs. The rise of localism that has adopted
strong “anti-China” positions implies more confrontation within the democ-
racy camp overall. Thus, the democracy movement in Hong Kong has en-
tered a new stage, with a more polarised democratic scene. Existing
literature has long recognised that the traditional pan-democratic camp
has been serving an important political function of promoting democratic
development. (3) However, the implications of the newly established localist
groups have yet to be thoroughly explored. By studying the gradual rise of
“localism,” this article attempts to examine why there has been an increase
in localist groups, what impact this will have on the democratic camp as a
whole, and how the authorities have responded. 
“Transition fatigue” in Hong Kong
The existence of a traditional pan-democratic camp in Hong Kong can be
traced back to the negotiations for democracy in Hong Kong since the mid-
dle of the 1980s. At that time, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, two democrats
who led a pro-democratic alliance with 95 groups, were invited to take part
in the Drafting Committee to design the Basic Law, the “mini-constitution”
after the handover. Although Beijing had no intention of providing any con-
crete promises such as full democracy, the democrats largely agreed to
maintain harmonious relations, and supported the reversion of sovereignty
from Britain to China after 1997 under the principle of “One Country, Two
Systems.” (4) In fact, Hong Kong’s democrats have always been divided by
ideological differences, but have sought room for co-operation on political
issues. The collaboration among democrats strengthened during and after
the Tiananmen Massacre. During the 1989 democracy movement in China,
Hong Kong democrats formed the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patri-
otic Democratic Movements in China to support the Beijing protesters. In
the meantime, disagreements among democrats generally decreased be-
cause the majority shared the common goal of supporting democratic de-
velopment in China against the bloody clampdown by the authorities. (5)
The wave of democracy movements further intensified after 1997. In the
early stage after the handover, the democrats were still working together
to fight against political control by Beijing. This sentiment kept rising until
2003, when the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) govern-
ment decided to enact the national security law (Article 23) in the Legisla-
tive Council, an anti-subversion law intended to constrain political rights,
resulting in 500,000 people marching on 1 July. Although the bill was finally
withdrawn by the government, this biggest march after the handover pro-
voked Beijing leaders to start intervening in Hong Kong affairs. After this in-
cident, the democrats repeatedly organised huge rallies calling for full
universal suffrage to elect the Chief Executive and Legislative Council in
2007 and 2008, respectively. In contrast, Beijing’s response was highly hos-
tile and criticised the democrats as attempting to destabilise Hong Kong. (6)
However, by 2008, “transition fatigue” existed among pan-democrats.
Some studies in hybrid regimes predict that a long period of political stag-
nation contributes to rising discontent regarding the status quo and attrib-
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utes responsibility to both the government and leaders of the opposition
camp. (7) Hong Kong democrats face a long struggle in the face of Beijing’s
desire for democratic display without substance. The Legislative Council
election in 2008 was marked by some democrats starting to urge the adop-
tion of a more progressive approach to pressure the authorities to make
political reforms. The League of Social Democrats (LSD), a relatively radical
party, proposed a “de facto referendum.” Their idea was for five out of 23
pan-democratic legislators, one from each of the five Legislative Council
districts, to resign at the same time, and called for the result of by-elections
to be viewed as a popular referendum on democracy. The Civic Party (CP),
led by professionals and the middle class, agreed to this action, but the
Democratic Party (DP), the leading opposition party, refused. The DP feared
that the resignations would antagonise moderate voters and infuriate the
Chinese government. Although the CP-LSD alliance won their seats back,
many democrats strongly criticised the rejection by the DP, and the political
rift within the democracy camp deepened. (8)
The divide among Hong Kong’s democrats increased drastically when the
DP decided to “bargain” with Chinese leaders over the political reform pack-
age. Direct face-to-face negotiations between Beijing leaders and DP legis-
lators were held in May 2010. After the discussion, DP chairman Albert Ho
publicly stated that he would urge party members to support the political
reform package when the government agreed to expand the franchise behind
the five new functional constituency seats to include Hong Kong’s 3.2 million
voters. Leaders of the LSD adamantly accused the DP of reaching “secret
deals” with the Beijing leaders and of “betraying” the democracy move-
ment. (9)
Following passage of the political reform package, the rift between moderate
and radical democrats grew wider. More and more pan-democratic supporters
were increasingly disappointed with the DP’s decision and shifted their support
to “radical resistance.” In 2011, People Power, a radical group led by former LSD
chairman Wong Yuk-man, advocated a “Vote-them Out Campaign” to “punish”
the DP in the District Council elections. They also advocated infusing new re-
sistance strategies such as filibustering and occupying events to push the gov-
ernment to make political reforms. More hard-line democrats were convinced
that a more “radical” strategy should be used to challenge “Hong Kong Com-
munists ruling Hong Kong” and to defend Hong Kong against the control of the
Beijing government. More importantly, they believed that pan-democrats were
too conservative and hindered the democratic movement. Their advocacy was
highly controversial at that time but incrementally changed the political culture
in Hong Kong, indirectly cultivating the rise of localism. 
The rise of localism
Growing dissatisfaction with the established opposition pan-democracy
camp’s efforts to challenge the existing political system has led many Hong
Kong people to consider a new direction to protect the interests of Hong
Kong. This is one of the key factors that has nurtured the rise of the localist
movement. In recent years, “localist camp” has become one of the most
popular terms used by local politicians and the media to describe politics
in Hong Kong (see Graph 1). Originally, the roots of localism were not po-
litical. The first wave emerged in 2005 when activists set up groups such as
Local Action to campaign to protect the Star Ferry Pier and Queen’s Pier
from demolition. By preserving Hong Kong history, these movements led
to a reflection on Hong Kong’s political identity.
Indeed, localism has taken on a political dimension over the past few years
with the growing tendency of Hong Kong people to distinguish themselves
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from mainlanders. Hong Kong people have been dealing with the “China fac-
tor” for more than a decade. More people are worried that existing mainland-
Hong Kong integration actually provides more opportunity for Beijing to
exercise political control over Hong Kong, resulting in the loss of local identity.
Also, mainland visitors have shown a strong interest in basic necessities such
as milk powder, drinks, and food, believing that Hong Kong products are sub-
ject to better quality control than in the mainland. This has led to temporary
shortages in several daily necessities, and the competition for daily products
between mainland visitors and Hong Kong residents has become politically
sensitive. (10) Negative feelings against mainlanders and the Beijing govern-
ment have contributed to an increasingly strong “anti-China” sentiment. 
Scholar Chin Wan-kan published a book entitled Hong Kong as a City-
state, advocating that Hong Kong “forget China and put Hong Kong first,”
free itself from Beijing’s political control, and differentiate itself from the
mainland. His discourse gained myriad supporters and became the foun-
dation for localism in Hong Kong. (11) Consequently, some localist groups
started establishing and organising a series of campaigns against main-
landers and the Chinese government. For instance, in February 2012, In-
ternet users raised HK$100,000 in less than a week to finance a full-page
“anti-locust” advertisement entitled “Hong Kong people have had
enough,” pouring sarcasm on mainlanders’ use of public resources such
as public hospitals and schools. In February 2014, around 100 localist ac-
tivists held “anti-locust” protests urging mainland tourists to “go back to
China.” (12)
Originally, public attention toward localist campaigns was not very high
as mainstream pan-democrats seldom support this sort of advocacy. The
key turning point was the Umbrella Movement in 2014. The failure of
the campaign indicated that the Beijing government was not interested
in offering real democracy to Hong Kong people and that its only aim
was to control Hong Kong, disappointing a large number of people, as
evidenced by a drop in trust toward the Beijing government: in late 2008,
the year of the Beijing Olympics, 53.1% of respondents trusted the Bei-
jing government, with only 14.4% not trusting it, while by the end of
2015, about 40% did not trust it, with only 35.2% trusting it. (13) This dis-
appointment further led to reflection on the existing “One Country, Two
Systems” policy and resistance strategies. Some people also attributed
the failure of campaigns to the leadership of the pan-democratic parties
and believed that shifting to “localism,” and thereby advocating new tac-
tics and objectives, was the only way out. Hong Kong has therefore de-
veloped an increasing number of discourses that mention the future of
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Hong Kong, ranging from Hong Kong Nationalism, which advocates in-
dependence, to Reforming Hong Kong, which urges the defence of local
interests.
In general, “localism” is a term for a group with a high sense of anti-China
sentiment and calling for either curbs on Beijing’s intervention or independ-
ence for Hong Kong. (14) Indeed, localists advocate different strategies of ei-
ther remaining non-violent or adopting radicalism. Soft-liners such as the
Neo Democrats have organised protests to urge reform of the Basic Law
and for Hong Kong people to come first in the allocation of resources. Hard-
liners such as Hong Kong Indigenous and Civic Passion have agreed to adopt
violent clashes with the authorities and mainlanders. They also see claiming
independence is a way of forcing the Chinese government to give genuine
universal suffrage to Hong Kong. Furthermore, some of them, such as the
Hong Kong National Party, have advocated establishing a “Republic of Hong
Kong” to take back sovereignty from China (see Table 1).
Differences between traditional pan-
democratic parties and localist groups
Although both traditional pan-democratic parties and localist groups de-
mand democratic reform and oppose political control by China, they have
different aims and tactics.
Conflicting identities: Chinese versus Hongkongers
To begin with, most traditional pan-democratic parties, especially the older
members, have a strong Chinese identity while the localists only identify
with Hong Kong. Based on their historical connection, the position of the
traditional pan-democratic parties is perhaps representative of political sen-
timents toward China. In terms of “anti-China” explanations, the democrats
claim that they are “patriotic” as they supported the reversion of Hong
Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China, and have a strong commitment to
China’s political, social, and economic development. Many traditional de-
mocrats identify with “cultural, ethnic, and historic” China rather than the
CCP regime. (15)
But localists have a strong identification with Hong Kong. Many of them
take a more critical attitude towards mainlandisation and the Beijing govern-
ment and emphasise that Hong Kong people are responsible for protecting
the core values and interests of Hong Kong only. In the face of rising political
intervention by China, they are sceptical of the “One Country, Two Systems”
principle because it cannot eliminate control by Beijing and separate the
mainland and Hong Kong. From the localist perspective, the Chinese govern-
ment is attempting to invade Hong Kong and weaken Hong Kong’s identity. (16)
This makes localists claim that they are protecting local identity and showing
hostility towards the Chinese government and mainlanders. They believe that
Hong Kong people should resist intervention by China and social disruption
by mainland visitors. In fact, under the atmosphere of heightened anti-China
sentiment, a recent survey in 2015 showed that an increasing number of re-
spondents (40.2%) identified themselves as “Hongkongers” while identifica-
tion as “Chinese” declined to 18.1%. This is compared with the survey in 2008,
when the percentage of Hong Kong people who identified as “Chinese” peaked
at 34.4%, while those identifying as “Hongkongers” stood at 21.8%. (17) This
phenomenon is most obvious among the youth. In terms of age group, 44.4%
of respondents aged 18 to 35 identified themselves as Hongkongers while
only 4.2% classified themselves as “Chinese.” (18)
Attitude towards democracy in China: Assistance
versus ignorance
The traditional pan-democrats have long advocated the belief that Hong
Kong and China are closely related and that people in Hong Kong have a
responsibility to assist in building a “democratic China.” They emphasise
that they object only to the one-party dictatorship of the CCP, human
right conditions, and the CCP’s intervention in Hong Kong. To some of
them, the political movement in Hong Kong is part of larger movements
in China, so Hong Kong should make use of its political freedom to help
mainland activists fight rights abuse and promote political reform. The
Tiananmen Incident candlelight vigils are typical examples, and the or-
ganisers, who mostly come from the pan-democratic camp, emphasise
their strong identification with Chinese during the campaigns and advo-
cate that “Hong Kong can get democratic development after China be-
comes democratised.” (19)
Localists have a strong objection to this argument. Newly established
associations claim that as Hong Kong is a separate political entity, peo-
ple should focus on local problems and Hong Kong’s future, and dis-
tance themselves from the democracy movement in China. Civic
Passion member Cheng Chung-tai, for instance, stresses that “the as-
sumption that Hong Kong would have no democracy unless China is
democratized is fundamentally flawed and such logic has been poison-
ing for long.” Hong Kong people don’t need to deal with the democratic
development of China. (20) Due to dissatisfaction with “patriotism,” the
University of Hong Kong’s student union and student unions from other
local universities held forums discussing Hong Kong’s future while Civic
Passion organised its own rallies in five locations on the night of 4 June
2016, becoming alternative events. (21) For many of them, the meaning
of June 4 is a reminder of the nature of an authoritarian regime that
killed its own people, and more importantly, an opportunity to re-con-
sider the future of Hong Kong. This marks an important difference be-
tween the two camps. The traditional democrats identify relatively
strongly with China, and only oppose the one-party dictatorship while
expressing strong sympathy for Chinese people. Localists, however, re-
gard the CCP regime and mainlanders as major roots of Hong Kong’s
problems. For them, the CCP’s political intervention is the primary rea-
son for the slow pace of development of democracy and autonomy in
Hong Kong. 
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Resistance tactics: Non-violent versus radical
approach
When facing the growth of political control, traditional democrats have
frequently organised various campaigns against “mainlandisation.” Most
likely due to concern over elections and their public image, they’re accus-
tomed to taking a “peaceful, rational, and non-violent” (heping, lixing,
feibaoli 和平，理性，非暴力) strategy, including organising assemblies,
sign-ins, demonstrations, and occupying roads to express their political sen-
timent. The annual peaceful July 1 handover protests are an example, and
they emphasise that a milder approach is the best way to gain society’s
support and apply pressure on the government. 
Although some soft-line localists agree with pursuing a non-violent strat-
egy that is closer to the approach of traditional pan-democrats, some other
radical groups accept that “the use of force to prevent violence with the
authorities” (yiwu zhibao 以武制暴) is legitimate in order for protesters to
protect themselves and the interests of Hong Kong. For them, “managed
and predictable” protests have no power for change and have been rendered
toothless, so this is the right time to opt for radical rather than mild strate-
gies. (22) Edward Leung and Ray Wong, the founders of Hong Kong Indigenous
with 20 members arrested in the violent unrest of the Mong Kok Riot, claim
that the Umbrella Movement was a “complete and utter” failure. They be-
lieve that when all non-violent protesting attempts have been fully utilised
but nothing can be accomplished, it becomes necessary to take a new di-
rection by exercising more radical resistance. (23)
Explaining the dynamics between pan-
democrats and localists: New partners or
enemies? 
Even though both the pan-democratic and localist camps share the com-
mon goal of promoting democratic development, the relationship between
them remains confrontational with little chance of cooperation. The crux
of their differences is the interests of Hong Kong and China. For many lo-
calist groups, the mainstream pan-democratic parties have not protected
and represented the interests of Hong Kong, as many of them still claim to
be “patriotic” by supporting political development and human rights issues
in China. Localists believe that Hong Kong people should concentrate on
protecting local interests rather than China’s. They therefore accuse tradi-
tional democrats of being conservative and failing to represent them. (24)
Some of them even believe that the traditional pan-democratic camp is
blocking the path of democratisation in Hong Kong and regard them as the
root cause of the slow pace of democratic reform. Although the two key
democratic parties, the DP and CP, are mulling over a plan to incorporate
elements of localism into their party manifestos in response to this rising
trend, many localists are still sceptical about their aims and methods.
The second important difference is the use of a strategy of resistance. DP
vice-chairman Lo Kin-hei, for example, has emphasised that milder methods
are still the most powerful against “mainlandisation.” In general, pan-de-
mocrats agree with the principle of putting Hong Kong first in resource al-
location but oppose localism out of concern of advocating xenophobia. They
stress that radical localism could turn into fascism, stirring up hatred and
discrimination in society. For them, the pursuit of localism should be guided
by universal values; otherwise, there is the danger of inciting some Hong
Kong people to attack mainlanders. (25) Based on their historical confronta-
tion and conflicting tactics, it is inevitable that the chance of co-operation
between the two camps is quite low and that tensions remain.
Illustration of government reactions towards
localist movements: Repression and co-
optation
In the face of rising localism, both the Chinese and HKSAR governments
have taken repressive and co-opting approaches to deal with it. On the
one hand, both have adopted a hard line by condemning the pursuits of
radical localism and “separatism.” Beijing leaders emphasise that a “mi-
nority of radicals” has been advocating localism and making use of some
incidents to provoke conflict in the relationship between Hong Kong and
the mainland. They believe that the radicals’ efforts have “seriously hin-
dered social stability” and that the Mong Kok Riot, during which police
officers were pelted with bricks and glass bottles and 120 people were in-
jured at the start of the Lunar New Year holiday in 2016, was an example
of such violent clashes. (26) Along with the Chinese leaders, Leung Chun-
ying, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, also expressed his strong condemna-
tion of the radical localist movement and promised to better equip police
to deal with violent attacks in the future. Some pro-Beijing figures organ-
ised a series of petitions and protests to support the police, and some
even urged speeding up passage of the national security legislation (Article
23) against “radical localism” and “separatism.” (27) Furthermore, a group
of pro-Beijing lawyers are calling on Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen to
formally prosecute groups advocating independence for Hong Kong, as
they have allegedly contravened criminal laws prohibiting seditious ac-
tivities. (28) This has aroused general debate over whether discussing inde-
pendence is legal or not.
On the other hand, some local government officials and pro-Beijing leg-
islators have adopted a soft-line approach and have attempted to co-opt
localism. Financial Secretary John Tsang Chun-wah has put a positive spin
on the rise of localism, saying that emotional attachment and a sense of
pride are quite common among Hong Kong people. This deep sentiment in
Hong Kong can be turned into a strong and constructive force rather than
being “merely a selective, negative and even destructive protectionism.” (29)
Together with him, a few pro-Beijing legislators such as Tsang Yuk-shing, the
President of the Legislative Council, have stressed that Hong Kong people
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in general have a strong passion and sense of pride toward their Hong Kong
identity, traditions, and culture, but that this sentiment cannot be escalated
into tension between Hong Kong and China. 
Overall, the position of the Beijing government is quite clear: it tolerates
localism in terms of identity, tradition, and culture, but when people’s de-
mands shift to “radicalism” in terms of anti-China sentiment, independence,
and clashes, the events are harshly condemned and suppressed. In Beijing’s
approach, this “red line” was adopted to place the interest of the Chinese
government as the top consideration.
Conclusion
Hong Kong has been facing increasingly strong anti-China sentiment to-
gether with a strong self-protective mentality in recent years. This sentiment
has increased significantly because of rising worries about political control
by Beijing, distrust of both the Chinese and HKSAR governments, and social
disruption and resource competition from mainland visitors. Emerging lit-
erature has long acknowledged the traditional pan-democratic camp as the
key actor against “mainlandisation” and political control. But a growing
number of Hong Kong people, especially the youth, have become impatient
and sceptical towards its discourse and tactics, and some of them have
shifted towards the localist camp in the search for new activism and strate-
gies against China’s political intervention. This has resulted in the rise of lo-
calism in Hong Kong. 
Localism is a political movement centred on the defence of Hong Kong’s
identity and autonomy. The movement contains a number of associations
with various directions, but most oppose the increasing political control
of the Chinese government. In terms of advocacy, localism emphasises ig-
noring political conditions in China with a focus on local issues only, rang-
ing from demands for greater autonomy to independence for Hong Kong.
In addition, in terms of resistance tactics, some localists advocate using
non-violent means or adopting radicalism that is clearly different from the
traditional pan-democrats. This localist sentiment reached a peak during
the 2016 Legislative Council New Territories East by-election. Edward
Leung, the founder of Hong Kong Indigenous, won 15.4% or 66,524 votes
cast in the election, while Alvin Yeung, the winner and a CP member, won
37.2%, and Holden Chow, a pro-Beijing candidate, won 34.8%. (30) This
strong poll result suggested greater acceptance of the localist movement
than previously thought, and that a large number of people supported tak-
ing more radical action not only at street level but also within institutions
against the authorities. For a youngster without any community work and
campaign experience, Leung’s performance took both the pro-Beijing and
pan-democratic camps by surprise. There needs to be reflection on why
tens of thousands voted for someone who was involved in violent unrest
heavily denounced by the government. It is foreseeable that the political
landscape is now divided among pan-democrats, Beijing loyalists, and lo-
calists, with the localist camp becoming the “respectable third.” (31)
The rise of localism is a warning to the authorities because China-Hong
Kong tensions remain unresolved and have even become more confronta-
tional. Ironically, this sense of stronger resistance has resulted in a vicious
cycle: Beijing steps up intervention in Hong Kong affairs while society de-
velops stronger anti-China sentiment followed by localism. However, the
HKSAR government has not taken any initiative to address the root of the
problem, so Hong Kong can be expected to witness more intense clashes
like the Mong Kok Riot. With Hong Kong people becoming more supportive
of localism, the political gap between China and Hong Kong will widen.
There are two possible ways to deal with this situation. On the one hand,
the Chinese government could accommodate the dissatisfaction of Hong
Kong people by heeding calls for constitutional reform, in particular the in-
troduction of universal suffrage for the Chief Executive and Legislative Coun-
cil elections, thus narrowing the gap. On the other hand, China could
exercise more political intervention to force Hong Kong society closer to
Chinese values. No matter which path is selected, it has to be acknowledged
that China-Hong Kong relations have entered a new stage that prompts re-
flection on the future of Hong Kong after the “One Country, Two Systems”
policy ends in 2047.
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